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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Jessy Cal Berry appeals from the district court’s judgment entered after a jury found Berry

guilty 0f grand theft for stealing a

district court erred

When,

in his View,

physically attacked the gun’s

Statement

Of The

Facts

gun and unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm. Berry argues
it

that the

denied his motion in limine t0 exclude evidence that he

owner immediately prior to

the time the

gun went missing.

And Course Of The Proceedings

On November 22, 2017,

Ofﬁcers Seibert and Krasowski responded to a report 0f a battered

female. (Conf. Docs., pp.31, 35.)

They found

Beverly Berry (“Beverly”). (Conf.

Docs., p.3 1 .) Beverly told the police that her grandson, Jessy Cal Berry, had attacked her. (Conf.
Docs., pp.31, 35.) She subsequently provided a written a statement to the police explaining what

happened:
Jessy [Cal Berry] showed up late afternoon at

my home. He

reeked of alcohol.

I

God, “Do

I have t0 do this[?]”
Suddenly he
my kitchen talking t0
screamed, “I hate you, you’re a bitch, you’re evil.” He got very close to my face
raising his ﬁst and said, “one punch and break your face. I can beat your head in
the wall. I want t0 kill you.”

heard him in

He grabbed me by pants and

and slammed me on the ﬂoor. He grabbed my
let me move. This lasted an hour and he wouldn’t let me use
the bathroom. Finally when he went to the back of the house, Iran to a neighbor’s
and locked myself in the vacant barn.
shirt

arms and wouldn’t

(Conf. Docs., p.48.) Beverly told Ofﬁcer Seibert that, after Berry

inside

and found “that her 40 caliber

H&K hand gun was missing.”

Ofﬁcer Krasowski gave Beverly a courtesy ride
p.35.) Beverly

was

treated

to the

left

her house, she went back

(Conf. Docs., p.3 1 .)

emergency room.

(Conf. Docs.,

and released from the emergency room, and an ofﬁcer took pictures of

her injuries. (Conf. Docs., p.31.) The ofﬁcer described the injuries as follows:

Bruising 0n right shoulder

Deep purple/black bruise under right arm’s armpit

Two

smaller (yellowing) bruises 0n back side 0f right upper

Small abrasion 0n lower back just

left

arm

of her spine (center)

Large purple/yellowing bruise on front upper right hip
Large purple/yellowing bruise on right leg inner shin area
Large yellow/purple bruise on center of chest just

left

.

.

.

0f center

.

.

.

Several bruises on right upper forearm to her right hand

Small

light purple bruise just

above right collar bone/lower neck area

(Conf. Docs, p.38 (capitalization altered).)

Ofﬁcers subsequently found Beverly’s stolen gun in Berry’s
p.129, L.2

— p.13 1,

bedroom of the
had

to force

stolen

it

trailer.

open.

(TL, p. 129, L.22

(Tr.,

The

that

— p.130, L3.) The lockbox was
The ofﬁcers found

belonged t0 Berry.

(Tr.,

in the master

locked, and the ofﬁcers

inside of the lockbox Beverly’s

p.130, L.14

— p.13 1,

L.5, p.135, L.4

p.181, Ls.2—22.)

state

charged Berry with battery, aggravated assault, second-degree kidnapping, grand

and unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm. (Aug, pp.8-1

severed for

(Tn, p.128, Ls.4-9,

The ofﬁcers found a lockbox under the bed

p.130, Ls.4-13.)

gun and numerous items

— p.139, L18,

theft,

L.5, p.178, Ls.2-12.)

trailer.

trial

the crimes against Beverly’s person

degree kidnapping) from the gun crimes
(Aug., pp.20-21.)

The

state

(i.e.,

(i.e.,

1.)

On Berry’s motion, the district court

battery, aggravated assault,

and second-

grand theft and unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm).

dropped the aggravated assault charge before

trial.

(Aug, pp.24-26.)

The

—

ﬁrst trial

was 0n the charges ofbattery and second-degree kidnapping.

The jury “came back With a

p.19, L.4.)

guilty verdict

included offense 0f false imprisonment 0n that case.”
Prior to the second

0n the grand

problem “that Count

(Tr., p.18,

know

The

—

district court

p.22, L.20.)

occurred

Berry

at

The

district court

about in deciding Count

Count

I

noted

have a prior

I.”

(Tr., p.19,

and then hear the evidence

(Tr., p.21,

L.19

believed that testimony from Beverly “regarding the events that
as t0

Count

state

II (i.e.,

I (i.e.,

grand

argued that

unlawful possession).

at

least

theft)

given the state’s theory that

p.24, L.19.)

L.19 — p.22, L.20.)

theft

the battery and false

and unlawful possession charges.

(Tr., p.23,

Speciﬁcally, the state argued that Berry’s attack of Beverly explained

Beverly immediately went to ﬁnd her gun

how

(Tr., p.21,

some information regarding

imprisonment was relevant to both the grand

explained

district court

trial

gun immediately after the battery occurred but wondered whether the evidence may

The

—

The

then raised, again sua sponte, a second evidentiary issue.

not be admissible as t0 Count

L.4

lesser

L.20 — p.21, L.16.)

home” was admissible

her

stole the

(Tr., p.19,

L.23

L.23 — p.19, L.4.)

(Tr., p.19, Ls.5-19.)

Ls.5-19.) Both parties agreed that the jury should ﬁrst decide

II.

8,

0n misdemeanor battery and a

[the jury] that the defendant is alleged to

II tells

felony conviction, which normally they would not

on and decide Count

1

the district court sua sponte raised the issue 0f bifurcating the

and unlawful possession charges.

theft

the “obvious”

trial,

(Tr., p.

after

Berry

left

and discovered

Berry came into possession 0f the ﬁrearm.

(Tr.,

it

why

was missing and

p.23, L.4

—

p.24, L.19.)

Nevertheless, the state acknowledged the potential prejudice and agreed t0 “limit[] the questions”

and “make every
p.24, Ls.15-19.)

effort not t0

have some of that information from

Berry objected t0

all

that prior trial

come

in.”

(Tr.,

of the information about Berry’s attack of Beverly

“wholesale” under Rule 403 as substantially more prejudicial than probative. (Tn, p.24, L.21 —
p.25, L. 14.)

The

district court indicated that the state

could have “some leeway in presenting that kind

who

0f background information of where the gun was allegedly taken from,

Mr. Berry had access

home 0n

t0 that

t0

commented

that the “the detail[s]

be presented, including the extent 0f Beverly’s

prior trial itself

day

in question

it

belonged

was alleged

t0

t0,

how

have been

between he and [Beverly].” (TL, p.25, Ls.15-24.) But the

taken, and the events that transpired

district court also

the particular

it

of the prior

injuries, the

trial”

did not “necessarily” need

photographs 0f her

injuries,

and the

and deﬁnitively excluded Berry’s convictions for misdemeanor battery and

false

imprisonment. (TL, p.25, L.24 — p.26, L.7.)

Beverly testiﬁed

at the trial.

(Tn, p.166, Ls.6-8.)

The prosecutor examined Beverly

regarding the day in question:

Q. So

I

want

to talk to

you about — you had an incident between you and

Mr. Berry.
A. Yes.
Q.

As

a result 0fthat incident, did you feel the need t0 leave your residence?

A. Oh, yes.
Q.

When you left was

A.

When I left the

Q. Okay.
you go?

A.

I

ﬁrst time, he

And how

far

It’s

still

was

in the residence?

still

in

my residence.

away from your residence were you? Where did

went and locked myself in

Q. Okay.

A.

Mr. Berry

my neighbor’s barn.

How far away is that from your home?

quite close.

I

really can’t judge the distance.

Q. Okay. Could you see your house from where you were?

A. Yes,

I

could.

Q. Okay. At some point, While you were outside ofyour residence, did you
see Mr. Berry leave your residence?

A.

I

saw him drive up

the road, and

I

thought he was probably looking for

me.
Q. Okay. At some point after — so

at

some point he did leave?

A. Yes.
Q. Did you see anyone else g0 t0 your house while
of time?

— in between that period

A. N0.

At some point did you
Yes,

I

What

did.

did you d0

>p>o>p

I

.

return t0 your house?

grabbed

When you

ﬁrst

my dog, my purse,

went back

and

into

your home?

left.

Okay. Did you 100k to see

if anything

was missing from your home?

when I

entered the

home was, I went t0 100k for my

The

ﬁrst thing

I

gun, the .40 caliber

did

H&K.

And why was that?
Instinct.

QPOPO

Okay.
I felt

he had taken the gun, but

Was the gun missing?
A. Yes.

(T12,

p.172, L.14 —p.174, L13.)

I

had n0 proof 0f that.

On cross—examination, Berry’s counsel asked questions suggesting that Beverly had loaned
her gun to Berry 0n the day of the incident.

(T12,

— p.187,

p.186, L.9

L.13.)

He asked Beverly

if

she had “ever allowed [Berry] to borrow any of [her] ﬁrearms,” and Beverly answered yes. (TL,
p.186, L.25

—

p.187, L.3.)

He

also asked if Beverly

Berry t0 use her ﬁrearms, and Beverly answered n0.

had ever revoked her permission

(T12, p.

1

t0 allow

87, Ls. 12-13.)

After the cross—examination, the prosecutor told the district court that the state had an issue

to

be taken up outside the presence ofthe jury. (TL,

had opened

to the

p.

1

89, Ls.16-25.)

The

state

argued that Berry

door to additional background information by suggesting that Beverly had

Berry borrow the gun on the day 0f the incident.

The

(TL, p.190, Ls.1 1-24.)

state

let

sought

permission from the court t0 ask Beverly about Berry’s restriction 0n possessing ﬁrearms due to
his past felony conviction, Without actually

t0 “delv[e] into that area

mentioning the felony conviction, and for permission

0f questioning related t0 his permission, 0r lack thereof, t0 borrow her

ﬁrearms.” (TL, p.190, L.25 — p.191, L.9.) The

and the State should be

district court

found that “the door’s been opened,

entitled to clarify [Beverly’s] testimony

examination appeared t0 be attempting to establish the defendant
that she

had given him permission

to take her

re-direct examination,

the nature 0f the cross-

may have had

guns” and found that “the State

through her potential testimony that that’s not the case and why.”

On

When

(T12,

is

permission and

entitled t0 clarify

p.193, Ls.10-23.)

Beverly clariﬁed that she misunderstood the question about

revoking permission and that Berry did not have permission t0 use her gun. (TL, p.195, L.23 —
p.196, L.17.)

Without mentioning Berry’s past felony, Beverly testiﬁed

would have loaned Berry a gun was “maybe 6
examination ended with
Q.
that

this

1/2 years ago.” (TL, p.196, Ls.7-13.)

The

re-direct

exchange:

Would What
gun?

that the last time she

occurred 0n that day have caused you t0 fear to give him

A. Yes.

(T12,

p.196, Ls. 1 8-20.)

The jury found Berry guilty of grand theft and unlawful possession of a ﬁrearm.
32.)

The

district court

(R., pp.3

1-

sentenced Berry to ten years, with three years ﬁxed, for grand theft and ﬁve

years, With three years ﬁxed, for unlawful possession of a

ﬁrearm and ran the sentences

concurrently. (R., pp.33-36.) Berry timely appealed. (R., pp.37-40.)

ISSUE
Berry

Did

states the issue

0n appeal

the district court abuse

its

as:

discretion

prejudicial evidence of Mr. Berry’s

harm

by allowing the
Ms. Berry?

State to present unfairly

t0

(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Berry

failed to

show

that the district court

abused

its

discretion under Rule

403?

ARGUMENT
Berry Has Failed T0
A.

Show The

Court Erred In

District

Its Pre-trial

Ruling

Introduction

Berry failed t0 preserve in the
defers a ruling

0n

[a]

motion

trial

court

a party must reassert an objection at the time of the offer

[in limine]

in order t0 preserve the issue.”

only argument 0n appeal. “If the

district court his

Gunter

V.

Murphy’s Lounge, LLC, 141 Idaho

105 P.3d

16, 25,

676, 685 (2005). Berry objected “wholesale” to the “speciﬁcs and details about [the] encounter”

between Beverly and Berry.
state

What “speciﬁcs and

deferred

its

ruling

(T12, p.24,

details”

L.21 — p.25, L.14.) The district court did not deﬁnitively

were admissible.

on Berry’s motion when

it

Instead, the district court, at least in effect,

said that

presenting that kind 0f background information of

.

.

.

it

would “allow the

the events that transpired

and [Beverly].” (TL, p.25, L.15 — p.26, L.16.) Berry then
the speciﬁc statements he

Even
motion, the

when

if this

now

challenges on appeal.

Court reads the

district court

district court’s

did not abuse

its

discretion.

He has

the evidence

was not

any of

thus failed to preserve his objection.

statements as a deﬁnitive ruling 0n Berry’s

Rule 403 allows for the exclusion of evidence

Berry attacked Beverly immediately prior to Beverly’s gun going missing made
less likely that

in

between [Berry]

failed to object during trial to

the risk of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value.

Berry took the gun and

some leeway

State

I.R.E. 403.

it

more

That

likely that

Beverly gave Berry permission t0 take the gun. Moreover,

unfairly prejudicial to Berry.

The

state did

not describe the physical attack

0r present any evidence of Beverly’s injuries. Instead, the state presented t0 the jury evidence that

an “incident” occurred between Berry and Beverly that caused Beverly t0 fear Berry and, more
speciﬁcally, fear giving Berry her gun. Because that evidence

theft

(i.e.,

went

directly to an element of grand

Berry wrongﬁllly took the gun), the evidence did not unfairly prejudice Berry.

Standard

B.

“‘The

Of Review
probative value of the evidence

district court’s ruling that the

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice
State V. Hall, 163 Idaho 744, 781,

was not

substantially

may be overturned only for an abuse 0f discretion.”

419 P.3d 1042, 1079 (2018) (quoting

State V. Labelle, 126 Idaho

564, 567, 887 P.2d 1071, 1074 (1995)). Although this Court typically applies a three-part test t0

determine Whether a
court “acted

t0

it;

and

.

.

.

.

.

.

abused

district court

its

discretion,

Berry only challenges whether the

district

consistently with the legal standards applicable to the speciﬁc choices available

Whether it reached

its

decision

by an exercise ofreason.”

Li. at 780,

419 P.3d

at

1078

(quoting State V. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 143, 191 P.3d 217, 221 (2008)).

C.

The

District

Presenting

When It Gave The State Some Leewav In
That Transpired Between Berry And Beverly

Court Did Not Abuse

The Events

Its

Discretion

As a preliminary matter, Berry failed to preserve his Rule 403

obj ection in the district court.

“[M]0ti0ns in limine seeking advanced rulings 0n the admissibility of evidence are fraught with

problems because they are necessarily based upon an alleged
testimony Which the

trial

would have before

court

it

at trial in

Hiter, 114 Idaho 688, 700, 760 P.2d 27, 39 (1988). Thus, a
discretion,

may

decide that

based 0n a motion

in limine,

record upon which t0
in limine

it is

of

order to

“trial

m

facts rather than the actual

make

its

ruling.”

judge, in the exercise 0f his

inappropriate t0 rule in advance on the admissibility of evidence

but

make his

set

may

defer his ruling until the case unfolds and there

decision.” Li. “In such an event, a litigant

is

a better

who has made a motion

requesting advance rulings 0n the admissibility 0f evidence must continue t0 assert his

objections as the evidence

in limine preserves

is

offered 0r his objections are not preserved.”

an objection only when “the

trial

0r inadmissibility 0f the evidence prior t0 trial.”

25, 105 P.3d at 685 (holding party

I_d.

waived objection

10

I_d.

In short, a motion

court unqualiﬁedly rules on the admissibility

(emphasis added);
after

ﬂ m,

ﬁnding “that the

141 Idaho at

district court’s ruling

on the motion

in limine

was

t0 decide the issue at a later time”

based on the

district court’s

recognition that the objected-to evidence “could be a part of Gunter’s tortious interference claim”

(emphasis added)); State

V. Pickens,

148 Idaho 554, 557, 224 P.3d 1143, 1146 (Ct. App. 2010)

(holding defendant failed to preserve objection because “the district court’s words in denying the

motion in limine contain n0 clear ruling on Pickens’ contention that Rule 404(b) required exclusion
of the evidence”).
Here, the district court did not unqualiﬁedly rule on the admissibility 0f the evidence prior

t0 trial.

Berry

moved to exclude any evidence of the

“speciﬁcs and details about [the] encounter”

between Berry and Beverly. (TL, p.24, L.21 — p.25, L. 14.) The
evidence could
(T12, p.25,

come

in

and which evidence had

L.15 — p.26, L.7.) Instead, the

And

district court

to stay out regarding

did not specify which

Berry attacking Beverly.

district court stated:

0n the

403 issue, the court is going t0 allow the
State some leeway in presenting that kind of background information of Where this
gun was allegedly taken from, who it belonged to, how Mr. Berry had access t0 that
home on the particular day in question it was alleged to have been taken, and the
events that transpired between he and [Beverly], although I don’t think the detail of
the prior trial needs t0 be presented, necessarily, with the photographs showing the
battery injuries and all 0f those types 0f things, simply the interaction that’s alleged
t0 have occurred between the two of them.
as far as a pretrial ruling

(TL, p.25, L.15
the State

— p.26, L.7 (emphases

some leeway”

1

.

added). 1)

.

The

district court’s

statement that

it

would “allow

clearly indicated that the district court contemplated resolving speciﬁc

questions of admissibility at

communicated

.

trial.

Similarly, the district court’s use 0f the

to the parties that the admissibility

word

0f the evidence could depend on

“necessarily”

how

the

trial

The

false

district court did unqualiﬁedly rule that Berry’s convictions for misdemeanor battery and
imprisonment were inadmissible and that Beverly’s testimony that the gun was in her house

before the incident

was admissible, which preserved any objection

as t0 that evidence. (Tr., p.26,

Ls.4-16.) But the state did not present the convictions t0 the jury and Berry
as t0 the convictions or Beverly’s testimony about the location of the

11

gun on

makes n0 argument
appeal.

played out. Thus, the only reasonable reading of the
court deferred

its

ruling until the case unfolded

Berry’s argument on appeal illustrates

“a blanket motion in limine prior to

evidence unfolds

at trial.”

Him,

at trial

But

1.)

statements

and there was a better record

Why this

t0

make

its

decision.

Court has refused to allow parties to make

700, 760 P.2d at 39.

at

that the district

is

and then be relieved of any obligation

114 Idaho

based on speciﬁc statements made
statements. (Appellant’s brief, p.1

trial

district court’s

to object as the

His appellate argument

is

and the inferences the jury could draw from those
time the

at the

below, those statements had not yet been made—all the

district court

district court

addressed Berry’s obj ection

had to work with were broad

categories of evidence, such as “the events that transpired between [Berry] and [Beverly].” (TL,
p.25, L.15

— p.26,

L.7);

ﬂ m,

and sometimes impossible, for the
other evidence admitted at

instance

what the

114 Idaho

trial

trial.”).

at

699-700, 760 P.2d

at

38-39

(“It is often difﬁcult,

judge to make a proper ruling Without the beneﬁt of all the

In other words, Berry

district court signaled to the parties

asking this Court to do in the ﬁrst

is

wanted

it

to

do

determine the

at trial:

admissibility of speciﬁc statements regarding the incident between Berry and Beverly With the

beneﬁt of knowing the context in Which the
district court

state

at

gave the
Beverly.

the statements.

at trial t0

failed to preserve

if Berry

state

any obj ection

preserved his obj ection, the

some leeway

probative value

is

substantially

district court

did not abuse

district court to

outweighed by a danger of

12

Berry had

E Him,

now challenges

to those statements.

its

in presenting to the jury the events that transpired

The Idaho Rules 0f Evidence allow a

Because the

trial,

preserve his objection.

700, 760 P.2d at 39. Berry did not object t0 any of the statements he

0n appeal. He thus

Even

elicit

did not unqualiﬁedly rule on the admissibility of the evidence prior t0

an obligation to continue to object t0 the evidence
114 Idaho

sought t0

.

.

.

discretion

When it

between Berry and

“exclude relevant evidence

if its

unfair prejudice.” I.R.E. 403. Berry

claims

applying Rule 403, “[t]he

that, in

district court

standards 0r exercise reason.” (Appellant’s brief, p.7.)

He

is

wrong.

The District Court Acted Consistently With Rule 403 When It Gave The State Some
Leewav In Presenting The Events That Transpired Between Berry And Beverly

1.

The

did not act consistently with the legal

district court

applied the correct legal standard in deciding Whether the prosecutor

could present evidence of the events that transpired between Berry and Beverly. Under I.R.E. 403,
“‘[W]here allegedly inﬂammatory evidence

is

relevant and material as t0 an issue 0f fact, the

court must determine Whether the probative value
unfair prejudice.” Hill, 163 Idaho at 781,

850, 853, 828 P.2d 879, 882 (1992)).

counsel correctly described

be relevant,

if there’s a

you know, even

prejudice, then,

(TL, p.24, L.25

— p.25,

403 operates, the

L.5.)

.

all

.

.

419 P.3d

substantially

at

its

operates:

outweighed by the danger 0f

1079 (quoting State

Immediately prior t0 the

how Rule 403

danger that

is

V.

Winn, 121 Idaho

district court’s ruling,

Berry’s

“Under Rule 403, even though evidence may

probative value

is

substantially outweighed

by

[unfair]

the evidence can be excluded under this court’s discretion.”

Without taking issue With Berry’s counsel’s articulation ofhow Rule

district court cited

Rule 403 and found that the

state

could have “some leeway”

in presenting the evidence but pointed out that the state could probably not use the

parts

trial

of the evidence, such as the prior

trial itself,

the photographs

more prejudicial

showing the battery

injuries,

and the convictions. (TL, p.25, L.15 — p.26, L.7.)

The only reasonable reading of the

district court’s ruling is that

403’s balancing requirement. Speciﬁcally, the
to

district court

it

properly applied Rule

found “the interaction

that’s alleged

have occurred between the two of them” probative but also found the more prejudicial

evidence—such

make

it

as the convictions for

misdemeanor battery and

past Rule 403 ’s balancing requirement. (TL, p.25, L.15

403 required.

13

false

— p.26,

imprisonment—could not
L.7.) That is all that

Rule

Citing State V. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 334 P.3d 806 (2014), Berry erroneously argues that
the district court abused

its

discretion because

it

did not detail

its

balancing 0n the record.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.) PLlccr does not lead t0 the result that Berry seeks.

state

sought to introduce a videotaped interview of the Victim into evidence.

334 P.3d

0f403

.

.

.

Li. at 138,

its

334 P.3d

district court

at

813;

at

[i]t

its

ﬂ

.

.

it

the balancing test, in this Court’s opinion, does not apply.”

refused to conduct the balancing required

State V. Ruiz, 150 Idaho 469, 471,

said,

‘You

that the district

by Rule 403.

can’t talk about

minimum mandatories’”). Unlike in PLlccr,

district court

M, where

conducted the requisite balancing, here the

district

court expressly cited Rule 403 and, at least implicitly, conducted the required balancing.

— p.26,

In fact,

their

L.7.) Idaho’s appellate courts

Rule 403 balancing on the record.

Court 0f Appeals interpreted

m

On

as a requirement that district courts detail

the contrary, in an unpublished decision, the Idaho

to stand only for the proposition that the appellate court

be able t0 infer from the record that the

No. 43726, 2017

district court

WL

1162197,

conducted the Rule 403 balancing
at

it

its

“implicitly engaged in the I.R.E. 403 balancing”),

14

must

test,

ﬂ

*5 (Idaho Ct. App. March 29, 2017)

(unpublished) (holding, under Riiz, the district court did not abuse

Rule 403 because

(Tr.,

have never required anything more.

no court has interpreted RLiz 0r PLlccr

State V. Ruggiero,

I_d.

248 P.3d 720, 722 (2010) (holding

afﬁrmatively stated Rule 403 balancing did not apply, and in

nothing in the record suggested the

p.25, L.15

The

Li.

discretion under Rule 403 because “[t]he district court here did not conduct

merely

district court

.

at 137,

“And the response With regard t0 balancing

812 (emphasis removed). The Idaho Supreme Court held

discretion because

abused

that analysis[;]

where the

not an issue here

is

334 P.3d

court abused

at 139,

refused t0 conduct Rule 403 ’s balancing:

403[]

157 Idaho

Parker argued that the statements were prejudicial under Rule 403.

at 81 1.

district court

In PLlccr, the

discretion

Which

is

when applying

consistent with the

long-held View of Idaho’s appellate courts that implicit ﬁndings and rationales can support a
district court’s order,

ﬂ

State V. Matthews, 164 Idaho 605, 609-1

(holding “the district court did not abuse

discretion

its

.

.

.

1,

434 P.3d 209, 213-14 (2019)

despite articulating a rationale

inconsistent with relevant legal authority” because the appellate court could infer

from the

“context” that the district court also relied on a proper, unarticulated rationale); State V. Floyd, 159

Idaho 370, 372, 360 P.3d 379, 381 (Ct. App. 2015) (“[W]e should examine the record to determine
implicit ﬁndings

articulation

which would support the

trial

court’s 0rder.”).

of how Rule 403 operates immediately prior t0 the

Given Berry’s counsel’s correct
district court’s ruling,

With which

the district court did not take issue, the district court’s express citation to Rule 403, and the district

court’s exclusion of the

more

prejudicial evidence, the record here demonstrates that the district

court conducted a proper Rule 403 analysis before giving the state

some leeway

in presenting

evidence 0f the events that transpired between Berry and Beverly.

The

2.

The

Reason When It Gave The State Some
The Events That Transpired Between Berry And Beverly

District Court Exercised

Presenting

found that the probative value of at

district court correctly

between Berry and Beverly outweighed the
committed grand
to deprive

theft

risk

of unfair prejudice. The

Beverly of the property.

was highly probative because

immediately

(R., p.15);

it

ﬂ

less likely that

sense dictates that Beverly

after

state

LC.

§ 18-2403(1), (4);

after

LC.

would have been

Berry attacked her.

15

(i.e.,

interaction

could prove Berry
so with the intent

Berry attacked her in her

Berry rightfully

In

§ 18-2407(1)(b)(6).

the timing of the attack and the attack itself made

Berry took the gun and also made

Common

some 0f the

by showing Berry wrongfully took Beverly’s gun and did

That Beverly noticed her gun was missing immediately

gun.

least

Leean

it

more

own home
likely that

with permission) took the

far less likely t0 loan

Berry a gun

Furthermore, the limited information about the attack that came in through Beverly’s

“Rule 403 does not require the exclusion 0f

testimony was not unfairly prejudicial t0 Berry.
prejudicial evidence.”

State V. Rawlings, 159 Idaho 498, 506, 363 P.3d 339,

rule only applies to evidence that

should base

its

is

unfairly prejudicial because

decision on an improper basis.”

I_d.

it

tends to suggest that the jury

The

(emphasis in original).

The gun was

Beverly’s testimony about the incident to the following facts:

347 (2015). “The

state limited

in Beverly’s closet.

(TL, p.169, Ls.4-22.) Beverly and Berry were the only two in the house. (TL, p.171, Ls.12-19.)

There was “an incident” between Beverly and Berry. (TL, p.172, Ls.14-16.) As a result 0f the
incident, Beverly felt the

need t0 leave her house. (TL,

Berry was

still

could

see her house.

still

inside.

(Tr.,

p.

72, Ls. 1 7-19.)

(T12,

p.172, L.24

L.13.) Beverly also testiﬁed that she

(TL, p.196, Ls.18-20.)

—

p.173, L.9.)

would have been

The

state did

it

Beverly saw Berry leave her house,

was missing. (TL, p. 1 73,

afraid to loan Berry the

None of the
all

12,

22

facts the state elicited

(Ct.

prejudicial because

it

gun because of the

injuries,

and did not introduce

from Beverly were unfairly prejudicial

App. 2012) (Lansing,

J.,

m

sequence 0f the events made

it

Virtually impossible that

Berry because

State V. Grist, 152 Idaho 786, 796,

it

relevant

is

is

unfairly

a non sequitur.”).

anyone except Berry took the gun.

Berry causing fear in Beverly showed Berry had a motive t0 take Beverly’s gun
t0 use her

t0

concurring) (“To say that evidence

possesses the probative value that makes

want Beverly t0 be able

— p. 1 74,

injuries.

of the facts were directly relevant t0 the crime charged.

275 P.3d

L. 1 5

not introduce any testimony from Beverly that

Berry physically attacked her, did not have Beverly describe her

any photographs of the

When she left the house,

p.172, Ls.20-23.) Beverly locked herself in a nearby barn where she

returned t0 her house, checked 0n her gun, and found that

incident.

1

(i.e.,

The

And

he would not

gun against him) and showed Beverly would not have permitted

16

Berry to borrow the gun.

Because Beverly’s testimony properly proved Berry’s

testimony was prejudicial but not unfairly

(Appellant’s brief, p.1

challenge in the district court.

objection prior to

trial,

the

so.

Berry also challenges on appeal several statements made by ofﬁcers during the
to Beverly’s injuries.

guilt,

But his motion

1.)

If the district court actually

trial

related

in limine did not preserve that

made

a ruling

on Berry’s Rule 403

the ruling allowed only evidence of “the interaction that’s alleged t0 have

occurred between the two of them” and excluded “the photographs showing the battery injuries

and

all

0fth0se types 0f things.” (TL, p.25, L.15 — p.26, L.7 (emphasis added).) Because any

ruling prior t0

trial

excluded Beverly’s

injuries,

Berry had an obligation t0 object

testimony he believed implied that Beverly had been physically injured.

E

at trial t0

any

State V. Gray, 129

Idaho 784, 794, 923 P.2d 907, 917 (Ct. App. 1997) (“Gray has failed t0 preserve his right t0 appeal
the statements

Which were ruled inadmissible but were testiﬁed

by Gray”).

to Without objection

Berry thus failed to preserve his argument that the jury could infer physical injury from the
ofﬁcers’ statements, Which he has only

now raised

for the ﬁrst time

0n appeal.

Moreover, the ofﬁcers’ statements were admissible under Rule 403 for the same reasons
Beverly’s testimony was admissible under Rule 403.

Like Beverly’s testimony, the ofﬁcers’

statements indicated t0 the jury that Beverly had a reason to fear Berry, Which
that

Beverly loaned her gun to Berry; explained

when

why

made

injuries.

The

closest

17, Ls.1 1-13.)

17

Furthermore,

any ofﬁcer came was

Beverly “was visibly shaken and very upset” after the incident, which made
Beverly loaned her gun to Berry. (TL, p.1

less likely

Beverly immediately checked on her gun

she returned t0 her house; and gave Berry a motive t0 take Beverly’s gun.

none of the ofﬁcers described Beverly’s

it

it

to say that

less likely that

Even assuming
error

it

was harmless.

certainly

the district court erroneously ruled

If evidence that

on Berry’s objection prior

Berry attacked Beverly was not highly probative

became highly probative once Berry’s counsel afﬁrmatively

Beverly’s cross—examination that Beverly loaned her gun to Berry.

E

t0 trial, the

at the outset,

tried to establish during

State V. Johnson, 163 Idaho

412, 426-27, 414 P.3d 234, 248-49 (2017) (holding erroneous admission of testimony harmless

because the same evidence was properly admitted

later in the trial); State V.

Rodgers, 119 Idaho

1066, 1071, 812 P.2d 1227, 1232 (Ct. App. 1990) (holding erroneous admission of evidence

harmless because the evidence became admissible later in the

trial).

Berry’s counsel asked a line

of questions trying to establish that Beverly had loaned her gun t0 Berry. (TL,
L.13.)

As

p.

1

86, L.9

— p. 1 87,

a result, the district court found that “the door’s been opened, and the State should be

entitled t0 clarify [Beverly’s] testimony

attempting t0 establish the defendant

When the

nature of the cross—examination appeared t0 be

may have had

permission to take her guns” and found that “the State
testimony that that’s not the case and Why.”

(Tr.,

permission and that she had given him
is

entitled to clarify through her potential

p.193, Ls. 10-23.) Thus, even if the state should

not have presented evidence 0f the incident between Berry and Beverly prior to Berry’s counsel’s
cross—examination,

it

could and would have done so after Berry’s counsel’s cross—examination t0

refute Berry” s afﬁrmative assertion that Beverly loaned

Any
State V.

error

was

him her gun. Any error was thus harmless.

also harmless because the evidence against Berry

Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d

38,

was overwhelming.

44 (2017) (holding error harmless “[b]ased

0n the overwhelming evidence presented against Montgomery

at trial”).

Beverly testiﬁed that n0

one else except Berry had been in her house between the time she saw the gun Where

and the time the gun went missing. (TL, p.169, Ls.7-22, p.171, Ls.9-19, p.173,
p.

1

82, Ls.5-12.)

E

L. 10

it

belonged

— p.174,

L.17,

She also testiﬁed that she did not give Berry permission to borrow her gun. (TL,

18

p.196, Ls.14-17.)

And

that also contained

numerous items

L.5, p.135, L.4

ofﬁcers found Beverly’s gun in Berry’s

— p.139,

Berry of grand theft or

that

belonged to Berry.

trailer inside

(T12, p. 128, Ls.4-9, p. 129,

L.9 — p.13 1

,

N0 reasonable juror could acquit

L.18, p.178, Ls.2-12, p.181, Ls.2-22.)

ﬁrearm when faced with

illegally possessing a

of a locked lockbox

that evidence.

Berry argues that any error could not be harmless because “the prosecutor used [Berry’s]
Violence as a theme in

by

its [sic]

case.” (Appellant’s brief, p.12.)

citing a statement in the prosecutor’s

was ‘about a
and

security.

lot
9”

more than

as

tries t0

the theft ofjust a handgun[;]

[i]t’s

about the loss 0f a sense of safety

In context, however, the prosecutor’s statements are

merely referencing the

fact that Beverly’s

gun was not just some object

but an object that represented “safety and security.”2 (TL, p.1 12, L.19

L.19 — p.217, L.17.) In other words, Berry

Supreme Court has

support that assertion

opening statement and closing argument that “this case

(Appellant’s brief, p.12.)

more reasonably read

He

inviting this Court t0

is

—

p.1 14,

L22;

p.214,

Tr.,

d0 precisely What the U.S.

instructed courts not t0 d0: “[A] court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor

intends an ambiguous remark t0 have

its

most damaging meaning or

that a jury, sitting through

lengthy exhortation, Will draw that meaning from the plethora of less damaging interpretations.”

Donnellv

V.

DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974).

Furthermore, the

district

court

repeatedly instructed the jury that the arguments of the attorneys were not evidence. (Tr., p.242,

L.25 — p.243, L.10.)
after the defense

Because,

at the latest, the

The

raises

at issue

would have become admissible

opened the door and because the evidence against Berry was overwhelming, any

error in the district court’s pre-trial decision

2

evidence

state also notes that

any
concerns of “safety and

was harmless.

theft, regardless

0f Whether

security.”

19

it is

accompanied by a physical

attack,

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Berry guilty of grand

theft

Court afﬁrm the judgment entered after a jury found

and unlawful possession 0f a ﬁrearm.

DATED this 28th day of August, 2019.
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